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Why Now Is the Time to Resolve 
the Dokdo/Takeshima Dispute 
Garret Bowman* 
Since the second half of the twentieth century, the Republic 
of Korea and Japan have been feuding over the 
Dokdo/Takeshima islets, a pair of small rocky landmasses 
located in the East Sea/Sea of Japan. Resulting from a rise of 
nationalism and the influence of historical identity politics, 
tension over the Dokdo/Takeshima islets is undermining an 
otherwise prosperous relationship between Korea and Japan. 
Given Korea’s de facto control over the Dokdo/Takeshima islets 
and Japan’s questionable claim to sovereignty under 
international law, this Note advocates Japan’s acknowledgment 
of Korean sovereignty. Korean politicians must also 
acknowledge the danger posed by pandering to nationalist 
populism and seek to create arbitration mechanisms for a 
peaceful resolution between the countries. This Note will 
conclude that resolving the Dokdo/Takeshima controversy 
presents a unique opportunity to begin unwinding the political 
tensions that threaten Northeast Asia’s productive economic 
interdependence. 
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I. Introduction 
“[T]o the Korean people Dokdo is not merely [a] tiny island off 
the eastern sea. It is indeed the symbol of Korean sovereignty 
vis-à-vis Japan and the test case of Korean sovereignty.”1  
 
In 2005, outside the Japanese embassy in Seoul, an elderly Korean 
woman sliced off her finger in protest of Japan’s continued claims to a 
rocky pair of islets roughly halfway between Korea and Japan in the 
East Sea/Sea of Japan. Dokdo/Takeshima’s East and West Islands 
have a circumference of 1.9 kilometers and 2.8 kilometers 
respectively.2 They are historically uninhabited, but efforts by the 
Korean government to assert ownership have resulted in a coast guard 
presence and seasonal occupation by two civilians.3 Western explorers 
and colonial writers referred to the islets as the “Liancourt rocks,” 
while they are known as the “Dokdo Islands” in Korea and the 
“Takeshima Islands” in Japan. The islets are the subject of an 
ongoing dispute that has existed since the removal of Japanese 
occupation from Korea at the end of World War II and has long been 
a sticking point in Korean and Japanese diplomacy. Most recently, 
the dispute was the subject of an ad campaign from both countries 
outlining their positions on the issue.4  
Korea has been in practical control of the islets since the 1950s.5 
Japan has consistently contested Korea’s claim and has been urging 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) jurisdiction over the sovereignty 
issue. However, Japan’s strategy of challenging sovereignty misses an 
opportunity to implement an arbitration system that would set a 
stabilizing precedent for a tense region. Even if Japan were to win 
 
1. KOREAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, DOKDO, KOREA’S 
BEAUTIFUL ISLAND 29 (2012), available at http://www.korea.net/ 
Resources/Publications/Others/view?articleId=3111#. 
2. Jon M. Van Dyke, Legal Issues Related to Sovereignty over Dokdo and 
Its Maritime Boundary, 38 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 157, 157 (2007) 
[hereinafter Van Dyke, Legal Issues]. 
3. Jon M. Van Dyke, The Republic of Korea’s Maritime Boundaries, 18 
INT’L J. MARINE & COSTAL L. 509, 524 (2003) [hereinafter Van Dyke, 
Korea’s Maritime Boundaries]; Shin Hyon-hee, Asia’s Territorial 
Disputes – South Korea: Perpetual Flashpoint, ASIA NEWS NETWORK 
(Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.asianewsnet.net/ASIAS-TERRITORIAL-
DISPUTES--SOUTH-KOREA-Perpetual--55449.html.  
4. James Simpson, Have the Dokdo Ad Wars Begun?, ASIA SECURITY 
WATCH (Sept. 12, 2012, 3:40PM), http://asw.newpacificinstitute.org/ 
?p=11481; KOREAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, supra note 
1, at 4 (outlining Korea’s arguments claiming national sovereignty over 
Dokdo/Takeshima).  
5. See Van Dyke, Korea’s Maritime Boundaries, supra note 3, at 526. 
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before the ICJ, the ruling would create a serious backlash from the 
Korean public that would harm Japanese interests. Further, Japan 
has claims over other islands that are aggressively challenged by 
China and Russia.6 Thus, using the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute to 
develop a regional arbitration mechanism to resolve these various 
island claims would more effectively serve Japanese interests than a 
continued insistence on what amounts to a lost cause.7 Moreover, in 
addition to the main sovereignty claim, there is also an issue over 
resource rights and economic boundaries. Creating a dispute 
mechanism would provide a forum to negotiate these claims as well. 
Korea, for its part, has resisted Japan’s suggestions to submit the 
Dokdo/Takeshima issue to the ICJ. Despite having a stronger legal 
position,8 Korea does not wish to potentially legitimize Japan’s claims 
to an island that Korea already controls. Further, domestic politics 
may make it politically infeasible for the Korean government to allow 
ICJ adjudication regardless of a likely favorable outcome.9 Instead, if 
Japan formally acknowledged Korean sovereignty over 
Dokdo/Takeshima, Korea would be more likely to settle on issues of 
resource rights and economic boundaries. Moreover, Korea shares an 
 
6. Seima Oki & Kyoko Yamaguchi, China, Russia Team Up on Territorial 
Claims, DAILY YOMIURI (Sept. 29, 2010), http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/ 
national/T100928004811.htm (referencing China and Russia’s joint 
declaration asserting their island claims against Japan over the Senkaku 
and Kuril islands respectively); see also Kuril Islands Dispute Between 
Russia and Japan, BBC (Apr. 28, 2013), http://www.bbc.com/news/ 
world-asia-pacific-11664434. 
7. See Van Dyke, Legal Issues, supra note 2, at 204 (arguing that from a 
legal standpoint “Korea’s claim to the islets seems overwhelmingly 
stronger”); see also Benjamin K. Sibbett, Note, Tokdo or Takeshima? 
The Territorial Dispute Between Japan and the Republic of Korea, 21 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1606, 1640 (1998) (noting that Korea has a stronger 
claim because it has “manifested greater affirmative acts of 
sovereignty”); see generally Michael J. Mazarr, The Angry Pacific, 
FOREIGN POLICY (Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/ 
articles/2012/11/02/angry_pacific (advocating for the U.S. to develop 
loose multilateral networks designed to build cooperation around areas 
of shared interests in the region). 
8. See Van Dyke, Legal Issues, supra note 2, at 204; Sibbett, supra note 7, 
at 1640. 
9. Takashi Yokota, Why Japan and South Korea Are Feuding over a 
Cluster of Rocks, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 3, 2012), http://www.newsweek. 
com/why-japan-and-south-korea-are-feuding-over-cluster-rocks-64765 
(describing Korean public outrage over Japan’s claims to Dokdo, and 
particularly after former Korean President Lee Myung-bak’s visit to 
Dokdo in fall 2012: “In the face of such nationalistic fervor, the South 
Korean government can scarcely back down. In fact, Lee’s visit to the 
rocks has raised the ante for any future South Korean presidents who 
may seek to prove their conservative credentials.”). 
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interest with Japan in obtaining a peaceful mechanism that can be 
used to resolve China’s territorial claims off Korea’s coast. 
This Note argues that there are three basic approaches for dealing 
with the island controversy between Korea and Japan: (1) the two 
countries can continue to leave the issue of sovereignty over the 
islands unresolved; (2) Korea could accept Japan’s offer to submit the 
issue of sovereignty to the ICJ or propose arbitration; or (3) the 
countries could adopt a novel solution where Japan recognizes Korean 
sovereignty in exchange for arbitration over the accompanying issues 
of resource and boundary rights. Of these choices, only the third is 
likely to succeed in providing a means for resolving the issue and 
promoting increased stability within the region. 
By recognizing Korea’s sovereignty over the islets, Japan can 
remove the strain from its relationship with Korea and lessen tensions 
in the region as a whole. Submission to the ICJ is not advisable 
because Japan has a weaker legal position, and Dokdo/Takeshima is 
an issue of vital national importance for Korea; thus, a ruling against 
Korea would be politically unenforceable. Moreover, while Japan is 
currently a party to ICJ compulsory jurisdiction, Korea is not.10 
Agreeing to arbitration or settlement of boundary issues would not 
only avoid these obstacles, but would also promote stability, as both 
Korea and Japan would have the ability to present a united front 
against Chinese territorial ambitions in the region. 
Part II of this Note provides a background of the dispute focusing 
on the historical context and legal framework. Part III explains why 
neither of the first two options listed above is feasible in the current 
Asian legal and political climate. Part IV makes the case for the 
adoption of the third option where Japan acknowledges Korean 
sovereignty in exchange for arbitration over unresolved maritime 
boundary issues and fishing rights.  
 
10. Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, 
INT’L COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index. 
php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3 (last visited Mar. 8, 2014) (listing Japan as a 
country that made a declaration accepting compulsory jurisdiction on 
July 9, 2007).  
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Figure 1: Dokdo/Takeshima’s relative distance between Korean and 
Japanese territory.11 
 
11. KOREAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, supra note 1, at 5. 
The islets can be seen from Korea’s Ulleungdo Island on a clear day. 
Arguably this proximity is a factor that supports Korea’s claim to 
sovereignty. See Van Dyke, Legal Issues, supra note 2, at 194 (making 
the argument that contiguity with other territory should be a factor in 
resolving the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute). 
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Figure 2: South Korean controlled Dokdo/Takeshima islets12 
II. Background 
A. Historical Context 
The controversy between Japan and Korea over the 
Dokdo/Takeshima islets illustrates the intractable difficulties that 
seemingly insignificant territorial disputes can pose due to their 
historical and political context.13 The Dokdo/Takeshima dispute in 
particular is complicated by a regrettable past that has yet to be 
 
12. Choe Sang-Hun, South Korean’s Visit to Disputed Islets Angers Japan, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/11/ 
world/asia/south-koreans-visit-to-disputed-islets-angers-japan.html.  
13. The summer of 2012 has seen a series of maritime disputes involving 
China, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, Taiwan, and the Philippines. 
Most notably, the recent flare up between China and Japan over the 
Senkakus/Diaoyus islands shows the danger of an approach that allows 
the disputes to continue without resolution. The risk of escalation into a 
larger conflict has become more plausible with Japan strengthening its 
coast guard in order to respond to China’s nautical incursions. China 
too has been increasing its fleet of maritime security craft armed with 
machine guns. Although this type of island squabble is not new, each 
time a skirmish flares up, trust between China and Japan erodes. The 
stakes are only going to get higher as China’s military rise takes place in 
a region still preoccupied with Japan’s former imperialism. See Todd 
Crowell, Japan’s Stealth Buildup of Its Coast Guard, REAL CLEAR 
WORLD (Oct. 12, 2012), http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2012/ 
10/10/japans_stealth_buildup_of_its_coast_guard_100273.html; 
Could Asia Really Go to War over These?, THE ECONOMIST (Sep. 22, 
2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21563316 [hereinafter THE 
ECONOMIST, Could Asia Really Go to War Over These?]. 
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resolved. Japan’s claims to the Korean controlled Dokdo/Takeshima 
islets and Korea’s response to these assertions are saturated with the 
historical context of Japan’s colonial past. For Koreans in particular, 
Dokdo/Takeshima cannot be understood without the perspective of 
its experience as a colonial subject of Japan. 
Japan formally annexed the Dokdo/Takeshima islets in February 
of 1905, five years before Korea was forced to effectively surrender its 
entire territorial sovereignty to Japanese colonial control.14 The period 
of Japanese rule lasted from 1910 to 1945, when Japan surrendered 
after World War II.15 The Treaty of San Francisco’s final draft in 
1951 outlined the relinquishment of Japanese colonial territory, but 
made no explicit reference to the islets.16 In the late 1950s, Korea 
reasserted its claims to the islets, eventually building a few structures 
and stationing guards on them.17 Japan opposed these actions and has 
issued regular protests over the islets while continuing to claim 
sovereignty.18  
Japan’s occupation of Korea during the first half of the twentieth 
century caused enormous hardship and suffering for Koreans.19 
Japan’s refusal to adequately recognize government-sponsored sexual 
slavery of Korean women is one issue of the notable imperialist legacy 
that continues to inflame relations between the two countries.20 
Although over the past 20 years Japan has periodically issued 
apologies for both the use of “comfort women” and the annexation of 
Korea, without material compensation to the victims or a formal 
 
14. See MIN GYO KOO, ISLAND DISPUTES AND MARITIME REGIME BUILDING IN 
EAST ASIA: BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE 63 (2009) (detailing 
the origin of Japan’s claims to the Dokdo islets). 
15. Id. at 66; Van Dyke, Legal Issues, supra note 2, at 158. 
16. KOO, supra note 14, at 69 (describing how after World War II, the U.S. 
provided a hegemonic balance between Korea and Japan and largely 
defined their postwar defense strategies, particularly by leading the 
drafting of the peace treaty). 
17. Van Dyke, Legal Issues, supra note 2, at 158. 
18. See id. at 189–92 (detailing Japan’s efforts to contest Korean control 
over the islands in the latter part of the twentieth century). 
19. See Jennifer Lind, The Perils of Apology: What Japan Shouldn’t Learn 
from Germany, 88 FOREIGN AFF. 132, 134 (2009) (outlining atrocities 
committed by Japan in East Asia during the twentieth century, such as 
recruiting or abducting women in order to provide “comfort” to 
Japanese soldiers, and mistreating prisoners of war).  
20. Kirk Semple, In New Jersey, Memorial for ‘Comfort Women’ Deepens 
Old Animosity, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/05/19/nyregion/monument-in-palisades-park-nj-irritates-japanese-
officials.html?_r=0 (detailing the Japanese government’s protest over a 
New Jersey monument to ‘comfort women’ who were victims of Japan’s 
imperial policies). 
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investigation and accounting, some have seen these statements as 
empty gestures.21 To the Korean people, Dokdo/Takeshima 
symbolizes the brutal thirty-six-year Japanese occupation,22 and 
Japan’s claims to the islets are seen as proof of an unapologetic 
attitude.23 The 180,000 Korean tourists who have visited the islets 
since Seoul began allowing tourists in 2005 represent the public’s 
investment in Dokdo/Takeshima as a symbol of Korea.24 Television 
stations give weather reports of the islets, and some stations end their 
daily broadcasts with pictures of Dokdo/Takeshima as the national 
anthem plays.25 One commentator stated that from a Korean 
perspective, the dispute is about “deep emotional trauma that 
occurred as a result of Imperial Japan’s brutal occupation that has 
since been internalized into Korea’s cultural narrative and represents 
an unhealed psychic scar that has become an article of faith with an 
almost religious significance.”26 
The Japanese public appears less engaged with the island issue, 
but is politically shifting, at least temporarily, to a more nationalistic 
foreign policy. This shift is evidenced by the recent election of Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe, who has made more patriotic overtures.27 
Nationalist Japanese political elements reject Japan’s “apology 
diplomacy” for wartime atrocities and seek to revise history textbooks 
and present Japan’s militaristic era in a more positive light.28 
 
21. Jon M. Van Dyke, Reconciliation Between Korea and Japan, 5 CHINESE 
J. INT’L L. 215, 229, 231, 234 (2006) [hereinafter Van Dyke, 
Reconciliation] (calling for the establishment of a Japanese Truth 
Commission to account for and aid in the reconciliation of war-time 
atrocities). 
22. See id. at 235 (discussing the need for Japan to give up its claim to the 
islands of Dokdo/Takeshima as a step toward reconciliation);Yokota, 
supra note 9. 
23. Yokota, supra note 9 (quoting former Korean foreign minister Song 
Min-soon). 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. Mazarr, supra note 7 (explaining that the island dispute is about 
national identity and can be difficult for outside observers to 
comprehend). 
27. See id. (quoting former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, “Japan’s beautiful 
seas and its territory are under threat,” and “young people are having 
trouble finding hope in the future amid economic slump. I promise to 
protect Japan’s land and sea, and the lives of the Japanese people, no 
matter what.”). 
28. Back to the Future, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 5, 2013), http://www. 
economist.com/news/asia/21569046-shinzo-abes-appointment-scarily-
right-wing-cabinet-bodes-ill-region-back-future (lamenting the right-wing 
appointments in Japan’s new cabinet). 
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Officially, the Japanese government argues that Japanese activities 
established sovereignty over Dokdo/Takeshima by the 
mid-seventeenth century at the latest.29 Japan’s dependence on island 
territory for establishing broad national boundaries and its concern 
about other island disputes involving Russia and China underlie 
Japan’s position.30 The government frames the Dokdo/Takeshima 
issue as separate from the historical narrative on which Koreans tend 
to focus. Japan’s official position is that resolution of the issue should 
be accomplished through submission to the ICJ.31 However, as 
referenced above and demonstrated later in this Note, Korean public 
sentiment and Korea’s control of the islets make mutual submission 
for a binding ICJ resolution unlikely.32 
B. UNCLOS: The Law of the Sea 
Regardless of the political and historical complexities of the issue, 
Dokdo/Takeshima’s sovereignty is relevant to the issue of resources 
and fishing rights. Both countries are parties to the U.N. Convention 
on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).33 Under that agreement, “[r]ocks 
 
29. Outline of Takeshima Issue, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN, 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/takeshima/position.html (last 
visited Mar. 8, 2014) [hereinafter JAPANESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS] (“Japan established the sovereignty of Takeshima by the 
beginning of the Edo Period, in the mid 17th century at the very 
latest.”). 
30. See Clyde Haberman, Japanese Fight Invading Sea for Priceless Speck 
of Land, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
1988/01/04/world/japanese-fight-invading-sea-for-priceless-speck-of-
land.html (discussing the perceived importance of an eroding rock 1,300 
miles southwest of Tokyo, “[w]ithout Okinotorishima, Japan’s exclusive 
economic zone . . . would be pushed back – to . . . an island nearly 400 
miles to the northwest.”). 
31. JAPANESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 29. It is interesting 
to note the contrast in tone that the Korean and Japanese governments 
use in describing their position on the dispute. Korean government 
publications highlight the historical context of the dispute and 
emphasize Korea’s emotional ties to the territory. Japan, by contrast, 
frames the issue from a more detached perspective and asserts resolution 
though the ICJ. Compare id., with KOREAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS, supra note 1, at 4.  
32. Demonstrating Korea’s intense public attitude toward this issue, 
smartphone users can participate in their own unsettling version of the 
Dokdo dispute by downloading a Korean developed game that requires 
the player to defend Dokdo by gunning down swarms of hostile 
primates. See Dokdo Defense, ANDROID GAMES ROOM, http://www. 
androidgamesroom.com/stand-alone-games/84944.htm (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2014). 
33. Chronological Lists of Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to 
the Convention and the Related Agreements as at 29 October 2013, U.N. 
DIV. FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, 
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which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own 
shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.”34 Japan 
claims that Dokdo/Takeshima’s outcroppings are islands and generate 
an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) under UNCLOS.35 Korea’s position 
is that the islets should be classified as rocks having no impact on an 
EEZ.36 Ultimately, Korea and Japan may negotiate 
Dokdo/Takeshima’s impact on territorial boundaries and resource 
rights, as they have shown willingness to compromise on territorial 
resource issues in the past when they entered a provisional fisheries 
agreement in 1998.37 Further, there are few restrictions on such 
negotiations, as “[s]tates are free to agree among themselves on a 
delimitation line that may even be inconsistent with general or 
conventional international law, unless third states are adversely 
affected.”38  
 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ra
tifications.htm (last updated Oct. 29, 2013). 
34. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 121(3), opened for signature 
Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) 
[hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
35. Van Dyke, Korea’s Maritime Boundaries, supra note 3, at 527. 
36. Id. at 526–27 (stating that Dokdo’s history as an uninhabited island and 
the U.K.’s renunciation of an EEZ surrounding Rockall northwest of 
Scotland indicate that the Dokdo islets constitute rocks and not 
islands). 
37. Id. at 527–28 (noting that the agreement allowed fishing by Japan and 
Korea around Dokdo at the exclusion of other countries). 
38. Jonathan I. Charney, Rocks that Cannot Sustain Human Habitation, 93 
AM. J. INT’L L. 863, 873 (1999) (“While international maritime boundary 
agreements can be considered to be state practice that may contribute 
to the creation of general international law, the use of an Article 121(3) 
rock in an agreement to delimit the maritime boundary between states 
is not violative of international law because Article 121(3) is not 
jus cogens.”). 
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Figure 3: Contested islands and islets in East Asia39 
III. Problems with the Status Quo and ICJ 
Adjudication 
It is notable that Korea and Japan have managed the contentious 
island dispute without catastrophic consequences for over sixty years. 
Some have argued that there is no reason to doubt the countries’ 
abilities to shelve the issue for the foreseeable future.40 However, this 
management approach is becoming less tenable because of two 
relatively recent developments: (1) regional uncertainty over the rise 
of China and the U.S. role as a deterrent to Chinese aggression; and 
(2) an increasingly assertive populism in Korea that government 
policymakers can no longer effectively control.  
 
39. Asia’s Disputed Islands—Who Claims What?, CNN, http://www. 
cnn.com/interactive/2012/09/world/asia.island.disputes/index.html 
(last visited Mar. 12, 2014). A number of island disputes in Asia have 
contributed to instability in the region. Dokdo/Takeshima is only one of 
a number of hotly contested claims between multiple countries. See id. 
40. See J.R.V. Prescott, Maritime Jurisdiction in East Asian Seas 48 (East-
West Env’t & Policy Inst., Occasional Paper No. 4, 1987) (stating that 
because the two countries have a record of solving maritime disputes, 
Dokdo/Takeshima is unlikely to become a flashpoint in the future); see 
also Yokota, supra note 9 (“Tokyo and Seoul could conceivably decide 
to shelve the issue and muddle through, as they did after they 
normalized relations some 50 years ago. It wouldn’t really solve the 
problem, but at least it seems doable.”). 
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A. The Rise of China and a Changing U.S. Role in the Region 
Given the rapid growth and industrialization of China, it is 
unsurprising that its growing regional assertiveness is a significant 
concern for all Asian countries. Should Japan and Korea reach a 
peaceful resolution to their own territorial dispute, these two 
countries could establish a precedent that could be applied to their 
respective island disputes with China. This is especially true for Japan 
in its conflict with China over the Senkaku Islands. Japan’s de facto 
control over the Senkaku Islands puts it in a comparable position to 
that of Korea in Dokdo/Takeshima.41 China claims the Senkaku 
Islands and has made intrusions into territory that Japan controls. 
Risk of escalation has become more plausible with Japan 
strengthening and repositioning its coast guard to deal with China’s 
nautical incursions.42 In direct response, China has also been 
increasing its fleet of machine gun-equipped maritime security craft.43 
Although this type of island dispute is not new, with every skirmish 
trust between China and Japan erodes.44   
Because Japan holds a similar legal position in the Senkaku 
Islands as Korea does with Dokdo/Takeshima, Japan’s concessions in 
the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute would be advantageous in the 
Senkakus dispute. Japan has an interest in establishing a precedent 
that de facto control of island territories is recognized and legally 
protects them from foreign incursions. By agreeing with Korea on 
Dokdo/Takeshima that the controlling factors in establishing 
sovereignty are use and development of the islets, Japan could 
theoretically bolster its position over the Senkakus.45 However, this 
strategy of asserting the status quo would not benefit Japan’s claims 
to the contested Kuril chain that Russia has controlled since the end 
of World War II.46 Nonetheless, the need for Japan to focus on 
 
41. The islands are known as Diaoyu in China. See supra Figure 3. 
42. See Crowell, supra note 13. 
43. Id. (explaining that China has increased its ocean research and fishery 
vessels, and has armed these vessels with machine guns). 
44. THE ECONOMIST, Could Asia Really Go to War over These?, supra note 
13 (giving an example from 2010 when Japan detected retaliation from 
China in the form of blocking the sales of rare earths that were essential 
to Japan’s industry in response to Japan arresting the skipper of a 
Chinese fishing boat). 
45. See Ayako Mie, No Quick Senkakus Fix, but Return to Status Quo 
Likely, THE JAPAN TIMES (Oct. 12, 2012), http://info.japantimes.co.jp/ 
rss/nn20121012f1.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&u
tm_campaign=Feed%3A+japantimes_news+%28The+Japan+Times+-
+News+%26+Business%29 (detailing the history and political situation 
surrounding the dispute over the Senkakus islands). 
46. See generally Kuril Islands Dispute Between Russia and Japan, supra 
note 6. The Kurils are four islands that stretch out from the northern 
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China’s threat is more important than other territorial disputes. With 
regard to the Kuril Islands, one commentator has echoed the 
considerations in this Note and has argued for Japan to make realist 
concessions in order to focus attention on Chinese encroachments.47 It 
would thus be prudent for Japan to refrain from asserting all 
potential island claims and instead focus on the feasibility of a 
successful outcome to each territorial dispute. A triage approach 
would allow Japan to set priorities in a region where assertive states 
are beginning to aggressively flex their nationalist territorial claims. 
Additionally, explicitly supporting the status quo concerning islands is 
an approach that more consistently supports Japan’s broader interest 
of regional stability.  
Korea also has a territorial dispute with China that could benefit 
from establishing a precedent of peaceful resolution with Japan. 
Beijing has recently challenged Korea’s claim to Ieodo Reef.48 The 
reef, which is seen as strategic militarily, lies 149 kilometers from 
Korean territory and 247 kilometers from China.49 The area has been 
home to several violent clashes, including the stabbing death of a 
Korean Coast Guard Officer by a Chinese fisherman in 
December 2011.50 A comprehensive solution to the Dokdo/Takeshima 
sovereignty issue would allow policymakers in Seoul to focus their 
energy on other issues like Ieodo, while reaffirming the territorial 
status quo. Further, Beijing’s aggressive strategy of using economic 
penalties such as suspending imports, halting tourism, and 
 
end of Japanese territory. The southernmost islet lies a few kilometers 
from Japanese territory. Because of the disagreement, Russia and Japan 
have yet to sign a peace treaty ending the Second World War. The 
dispute emerged from conflicting interpretations of the results of the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, in many ways similar to the 
Dokdo/Takeshima controversy. See id. 
47. See Richard Weitz, Why Russia is Challenging Japan over Kurils, 
WORLD POLITICS REVIEW (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www. 
worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/8038/global-insights-why-russia-is-
challenging-japan-over-kurils (“In the long term, one would expect the 
Japanese to make the most concessions, since China’s continuing rise 
presents a greater threat to Tokyo’s interests. . . . The resulting 
improvement in Russian-Japanese relations would allow the Japanese to 
concentrate their efforts on matching China’s growing economic and 
military power, while possibly also inducing the Chinese to moderate 
their policies toward Japan.”). 
48. Steven Borowiec, China’s Next Flashpoint?, THE DIPLOMAT (Mar. 22, 
2012), http://thediplomat.com/2012/03/22/china’s-next-flashpoint/?all 
=true. Korea’s position on the reef echoes its stance on Dokdo that the 
rocks obviously belong to Korea and there is no debate to be had on the 
issue. See id. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
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encouraging boycotts would have a smaller impact against a unified 
Korean and Japanese position on island sovereignty and control.51  
Underlying both countries’ considerations is a shifting regional 
balance of power. In a post-Cold War security environment, the U.S. 
role as an ultimate pacifier of tension between Korea and Japan has 
diminished due to the rising nationalism in those countries.52 
Although the U.S. has begun to focus on a much publicized “pivot” 
towards Asia, China has emerged as a significant rival to the U.S. in 
the region.53 In a worst-case scenario, China could theoretically resort 
to small-scale military engagements to enforce its island claims.54 
While force against Korea or Japan is unlikely in the foreseeable 
future, Russia’s war with neighboring Georgia over South Ossetia has 
shown how superpowers are still able to carry out small-scale wars 
 
51. See Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, Why China Won’t Turn the Other 
Cheek over Foreign Policy, CNN (Nov. 15, 2012), 
http://edition.cnn.com/2012/11/13/opinion/china-naval-disputes/ 
(“China is now increasingly using its economic might to advance 
political ends—even when this hurts China itself. According to one 
Chinese analyst, ‘These measures will hurt China. But they hurt Japan 
more’”). See also Frank Ching, ASEAN, Be Careful of China’s Tactics, 
THE CHINA POST (Aug. 11, 2010), http://chinapost.com.tw/ 
commentary/the-china-post/frank-ching/2010/08/11/268169/ASEAN-
be.htm. China has applied a “divide and conquer” strategy when 
asserting claims in the South China Sea. Thus, “ASEAN members 
should know that individually they have little strength but, if they stay 
united, they can be a formidable political force.” Id. Although Korea 
and Japan arguably have greater individual influence than the ASEAN 
countries, retaining and strengthening their alliance would serve well in 
resisting China’s territorial ambitions. 
52. Jean-Pierre Lehmann, Nationalism Rises in Northeast Asia, REAL 
CLEAR WORLD (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.realclearworld.com/ 
articles/2013/01/07/nationalism_rises_in_northeast_asia_100455.html 
(asserting that despite economic cooperation, rising nationalism 
threatens to undo the gains of global interdependence in the region); 
Mazarr, supra note 7 (“The conventional wisdom says that the main 
test of American strategy in Asia is the ‘rise of China.’ In fact, a far 
bigger challenge may be the growing dominance of these emotional 
identity issues, because traditional U.S. instruments of statecraft are 
simply not well suited to dealing with them.”). 
53. On the Rocks, Again, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 24, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21567108-barack-obama-courts-
region-odds-over-south-china-sea-rocks-again [hereinafter THE 
ECONOMIST, On the Rocks, Again] (noting that anxiety over China’s 
new assertiveness is a significant motivation for America’s deepening 
engagement in Asia).  
54. See Jens Kastner, Small Wars Loom Large on China’s Horizon, ASIA 
TIMES (Apr. 6, 2012), http://atimes.com/atimes/China/ND06Ad02. 
html; see also Mie, supra note 45 (“A military confrontation is the last 
thing we want,” Endo at the University of Tsukuba said, “but we have 
to brace for every possibility.”). 
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with relatively little international or economic consequences.55 At the 
very least, Japan and Korea are interested in protecting their 
territorial claims in light of China’s growing assertiveness. To the 
extent that Dokdo/Takeshima is a distraction from this interest, a 
decisive resolution is advisable. Both countries have the opportunity 
to assume leadership in a lasting regional stability. Within the 
context of their other island claims, a Dokdo/Takeshima solution is 
within Korea and Japan’s national interests. 
B. The Adverse Effect of Korean Populism on Compromise and 
De-Escalation 
Nationalism is on the rise in Asia.56 This is particularly true in 
Korea, where a transition to democracy was not finalized until the 
late 1990s.57 With the rise of democracy has come the power of 
populism to influence Korean leaders’ decisions over foreign policy. 
This has had a particular impact on Japanese and Korean relations 
that are still influenced by a regrettable history that left its mark on 
both nations’ consciousness.58  
In the past, some commentators expressed confidence that Japan 
and Korea could continue to peaceably manage the Dokdo/Takeshima 
dispute.59 However, recent history has called this certainty into 
question. Political and foreign policy elites no longer exclusively 
influence and set policy on the Dokdo/Takeshima issue.60 Sagging poll 
 
55. Id. (commenting that after the war with Russia, there were no major 
economic effects in countries other than Georgia).  
56. Lehmann, supra note 52; Mazarr, supra note 7 (“Globalization and 
interdependence are making people nostalgic for a more secure grasp on 
local cultures and traditions. The result is likely to be a period whose 
major risks of conflict will derive less from intentional calculations of 
national advantage than from a boiling clash of identity, pride, prestige, 
nationalism, and honor.”).  
57. See Peter M. Beck, Can Mubarak Follow South Korea’s Path?, COUNCIL 
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Feb. 3, 2011), http://www.cfr.org/middle-
east/can-mubarak-follow-south-koreas-path/p24006 (outlining Korea’s 
transition from dictatorship to democracy). 
58. See Mazarr, supra note 7 (“In Seoul, a perfect storm of . . . 
emotion-laden historical legacies, rising national pride and assertiveness, 
and the political calculations of current leadership generated a 
willingness to provoke a crisis.”). 
59. See, e.g., Prescott, supra note 40, at 48 (“Fortunately, ownership of 
these islands does not appear to be a source of current friction. These 
two countries already have a record of solving maritime disputes, so it is 
safe to conclude that Take Shima [sic] will not prove to be a flashpoint 
in the East Asian Seas.”). 
60. See Mazarr, supra note 7 (describing a university sponsored “I Love 
Dokdo” contest with goals “to express our love for Dokdo” and showcase 
“the people who have protected Dokdo throughout history”).  
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numbers and a need to showcase his nationalist credentials spurred 
then-President Lee Myung-bak’s 2012 controversial visit to 
Dokdo/Takeshima.61 Indeed, the visit resulted in a ten-point rise in 
his approval rating.62 Rumors about Korean politicians compromising 
or capitulating over the Dokdo/Takeshima issue carry political 
consequences.63 In this environment, populist sentiment may very well 
thwart realist concerns about seeking a cool-headed resolution to a 
potential flare-up.64 Both Korea and Japan have an interest in 
removing this element from what is otherwise a very productive 
economic relationship. 
In light of historical animosity between the two countries, the 
appropriate question may not be what factors provoked the past 
conflicts but instead what factors have prevented the conflicts from 
escalating further. One factor is the level of economic interdependence 
between the two countries. In 2004, when Korea’s GDP was less than 
$700 billion, Korea imported over $46 billion from Japan while 
exporting $21 billion.65 These numbers have increased nearly every 
year since the 1960s.66 While there is confidence that this relationship 
will continue, even a small amount of pessimism about future 
economic interdependence may “spin the island dispute out of 
control.”67 The danger is that either country may develop a 
willingness to forsake the economic relationship for political goals as 
China has done in its relationship with Japan.68  
 
61. See Yokota, supra note 9.  
62. Id.  
63. See KOO, supra note 14, at 91 (“South Korea and Japan . . . signed a 
new fishery agreement in winter 1998–99, bringing a quick, if not quiet, 
end to the third round of dispute. The new fishery agreement shelved 
the sovereignty question by following a complicated formula long 
advocated by Japan, but heretofore rejected by South Korea. The 
signing of the new fishery accord and shelving of the territorial question 
exacted political costs for [Korean President] Kim, but he had few 
alternatives in the wake of South Korea’s near economic collapse and 
the dire need for emergency loans from Japan.”). 
64. See Mazarr, supra note 7 (cautioning that America’s strategic policies in 
Northeast Asia overlook the power of pride and national identity, 
particularly in South Korea). 
65. KOO, supra note 14, at 68. 
66. Id. at 67–68. 
67. Id. at 98. 
68. Kleine-Ahlbrandt, supra note 51 (“China is now increasingly using its 
economic might to advance political ends—even when it hurts China 
itself. According to one Chinese analyst, ‘These measures will hurt 
China. But they hurt Japan more.’”). 
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Even if full-scale confrontation can continue to be avoided, public 
ill will fueled by the islets may have economic consequences on both 
Korea and Japan.69 Resolving the sovereignty issue would pave the 
way for decisive boundary agreements and possible collaborations over 
future resource discoveries in the area.70 
C. Neither ICJ Jurisdiction nor Arbitration over the Sovereignty Issue 
Is Feasible 
A submission to the ICJ to determine which country’s historical 
and legal claims are stronger is considered by some to be a reasonable 
means for resolving the Dokdo/Takeshima issue.71 However, at least 
for Korea, the issue is not about rational resolution; rather, it hinges 
on pride, history, and national identity.72 Moreover, Korea has little 
incentive to submit the issue to the ICJ since it already controls the 
islets. Japan has proposed submission to the ICJ in 1954, 1962, and 
2012.73 There is little reason to believe that Korea will reverse its 
position after 60 years of refusing binding adjudication.74 If anything,  
69. See Daniel McGroarty, The Scramble for Asia’s Resources, REAL CLEAR 
WORLD (Nov. 23, 2012), http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/ 
2012/11/23/rare_earths_asia_pivot_and_the_pacific_reset_100365.ht
ml (mentioning that Japanese discomfort with China’s regional 
aspirations has led to a policy of seeking to cut Japan’s dependence on 
Chinese rare earth minerals 50 percent by mid-2013). 
70. See Jan Paulsson, Boundary Disputes into Twenty-First Century: Why, 
How . . . and Who?, 95 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 122, 122 (2001) (“It 
has become accepted that stable boundaries, even if seemingly arbitrary, 
contribute to international peace and security by removing one possible 
source of friction between neighboring states.”). 
71. See, e.g., Phil Haas, Status and Sovereignty of the Liancourt Rocks: The 
Dispute Between Japan and Korea, 15 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 2, 26 
(concluding Korea has a stronger claim under international law and 
should accept international arbitration). 
72. Mazarr, supra note 7 (asserting that for Koreans, Dokdo is a matter of 
pride, not logic or reason); see also Van Dyke, Korea’s Maritime 
Boundaries, supra note 3, at 535 (“Korea will never abandon its claim to 
Tok-Do.”). 
73. Proposal of Referral to the International Court of Justice, MINISTRY OF 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-
paci/takeshima/proposal.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2014); see Park Ki-
gab, Japan’s Dokdo Claim Debases Dignity of ICJ, THE KOREA TIMES 
(Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2013/ 
01/251_123693.html (suggesting that Japan’s failure to submit its other 
island disputes (Senkaku and the Kurils) to the ICJ indicates the 
deliberately provocative nature of Japan’s suggestion that it could 
unilaterally request ICJ arbitration over Dokdo/Takeshima). 
74. See KOREAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, supra note 1, at 
29 (“Korea has the territorial rights ab initio over Dokdo and sees no 
reason why she should seek the verification of her rights before any 
international court of justice.”).  
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Korea’s political leaders have an incentive to use the issue as a 
political rallying cry while Korea’s continued control over the 
territory solidifies over time. Even if Japan were able to succeed in 
gaining submission to the ICJ and a favorable decision, it is not clear 
that it would be politically feasible for the Korean government to 
comply with an adverse ruling. Rumors of Korean leaders 
relinquishing sovereignty in exchange for economic aid led to violent 
protests and political opposition in the 1960s and 1990s.75 Recent 
Japanese pronouncements related to the island have spurred Korean 
protests involving self-mutilation and, in one case, the symbolic 
beheading of Japan’s national bird.76 With fears of an adverse public 
response, coupled with the fact that Korea already controls the island, 
it is hard to see how dismantling this infrastructure would work 
practically if the ICJ ruled against Korea. 
Submitting the sovereignty issue to an ad hoc tribunal for 
arbitration would also require that both parties be willing to abide by 
a potentially unfavorable decision. As one commentator stated, “the 
use of arbitration to solve territorial disputes can be successful only 
where the parties are committed to resolving the dispute peacefully 
through arbitration and . . . such a commitment is unlikely if the 
dispute involves an issue considered to be of vital national 
importance.”77  
The question of sovereignty is too intertwined with Korean 
identity to be resolved by a tribunal.78 A Korean government 
advertisement captures the reality of the situation: “[T]o the Korean 
people Dokdo is not merely [a] tiny island off the eastern sea. It is 
indeed the symbol of Korean sovereignty vis-à-vis Japan and the test 
case of the integrity of Korean sovereignty.”79 Although nationalist 
fever accompanies most territorial disputes, a legal victory for Japan 
 
75. See KOO, supra note 14, at 74, 92. 
76. See Charles Scanlon, S. Korean Fury over Island Dispute, BBC 
(Mar. 14, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4347851.stm 
(describing an elderly woman slicing off her finger with shears and a 
middle-aged man cutting off his finger with a meat cleaver outside the 
Japanese embassy in Seoul); see also S. Korea Reportedly Plans to Build 
Hotel on Disputed Islets, JAPAN TODAY (Jul. 21, 2008), 
http://www.japantoday.com/category/politics/view/south-korean-pm-
accuses-japan-of-jeopardizing-peace-over-isles (describing Korean 
protestors beheading pheasants in 2005). 
77. Carla S. Copeland, The Use of Arbitration to Settle Territorial Disputes, 
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3073, 3074 (1999). 
78. See KOREAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, supra note 1, at 
29 (describing Dokdo as the symbol of Korean sovereignty); also see 
Van Dyke, Korea’s Maritime Boundaries, supra note 3, at 535. 
79. KOREAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, supra note 1, at 29. 
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would lead to a change from the sixty-year status quo.80 Within the 
current tense political climate, such a change appears far from likely. 
IV. A Comprehensive Approach Towards a Tenable 
Solution 
Japan should acknowledge Korean sovereignty over 
Dokdo/Takeshima in exchange for a stipulation that the islets will 
not impact territorial rights under UNCLOS and an agreement to 
arbitrate unresolved boundary issues and joint economic development 
rights.81 This proposal admittedly amounts to a Japanese concession 
and compromise from its current stance that the issue should be 
submitted to the ICJ. However, by adopting a conciliatory approach, 
Japan can gain more than it is relinquishing. Due to a tenuous 
position under international law, Japan’s concessions will be limited 
to losing the leverage of Dokdo/Takeshima as a bargaining tool. As 
outlined previously and argued in this section, the downside of having 
this bargaining tool can be measured by a rift between the two 
countries that in the future may not close as readily as it has in the 
past.82 Japan still has the opportunity to use Dokdo/Takeshima as a 
bargaining chip, but it should cash the chip in now while it has the 
most to gain and the least to lose. 
A. International Law Favors Korean Sovereignty 
Japan has little to gain by submitting the issue of 
Dokdo/Takeshima’s sovereignty to the ICJ. Under the accepted 
norms of international law, Japan’s historical and legal claims over 
Dokdo/Takeshima are substantially weaker than Korea’s.83  
 
80. See Van Dyke, Korea’s Maritime Boundaries, supra note 3, at 526 
(stating that as soon as Korea regained its independence it asserted 
control over the Dokdo/Takeshima islets). 
81. See id. at 526–27 (stating that classifying Dokdo as an island is not 
supported by Article 121(3), and that classifying it as a rock is a better 
approach); see also Charney, supra note 38, at 873 (“States are free to 
agree among themselves on a delimitation line that may even be 
inconsistent with general or conventional international law, unless third 
states are adversely affected.”). 
82. See Van Dyke, Reconciliation, supra note 21, at 238 (“Japan’s 
renunciation of its claim over Dokdo/Takeshima could prove to be a 
very useful gesture to promote genuine reconciliation between the 
countries.”). A shift in America’s role as a Cold War mediator and 
increasingly populist influences in Japan and Korea are trends that will 
make future compromise more difficult. See Lehmann, supra note 52 
(describing how rising nationalism can stymie reconciliation); see also 
Mazarr, supra note 7. 
83. See Van Dyke, Korea’s Maritime Boundaries, supra note 3, at 524 
(“Korea’s claim to sovereignty over the islets is stronger than that of 
Japan, based on the historical evidence of the exercise of sovereignty 
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Article 38 of the ICJ Statute defines the sources of international 
law to include international customs, general principles of law, and 
judicial decisions.84 Under modern customary international law, 
territory belongs to the country that can make a showing of effective 
control.85 In other words, “[T]erritory is awarded on the basis of the 
preponderance of administrative, social, geographical, historical and 
cultural factors linked with the territory.”86 For example, in another 
territorial dispute, the tribunal deciding the Eritrea-Yemen 
arbitration stated, “[t]he modern international law of acquisition (or 
attribution) of territory generally requires that there be: an 
intentional display of power and authority over the territory, by the 
 
and the principle of contiguity (because the islets are closer to Korea’s 
Ullong-do than to Japan’s Oki Islands), but most importantly because of 
Korea’s actual physical control of the islets during the past half 
century.”); see also Sibbett, supra note 7, at 1646 (concluding that 
Korea’s claims to Dokdo are stronger than Japan’s). 
84. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 
Stat. 1055, 1060, 33 U.N.T.S. 993, states:  
1.  The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with 
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall 
apply:  
a.  international conventions, whether general or 
particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by 
the contesting states;  
b.  international custom, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law;  
c.  the general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations;  
d.  subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions 
and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists 
of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law.  
2.  This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to 
decide a case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto. 
85. JEFFERY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 9 (2002) (“[A]rbitral 
tribunals recognized by the end of the century that effective control over 
the territory––in terms of constant, peaceful, and acknowledged use––
more than the original form of acquisition, was the key to title.”). 
86. See SURYA P. SHARMA, TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION, DISPUTES AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 191 (1997); see also Van Dyke, Legal Issues, supra 
note 2, at 167 (suggesting that Japan’s previously held contention that 
Dokdo was “terra nullius” in 1905 may prohibit Japan from now 
exerting sovereignty). 
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exercise of jurisdiction and state functions, on a continuous and 
peaceful display.”87  
Japan’s occupation during the first part of the twentieth century 
is not likely a relevant factor because Korea was unable to contest 
sovereignty after military occupation by Japan starting in 1904.88 
Japan instead argues that annual bamboo harvesting and sea lion 
hunting during the mid-seventeenth century were sufficient to 
constitute effective control until Dokdo/Takeshima’s incorporation 
into the Shimane Prefecture during the occupation of Korea in 1905.89 
Japan also argues that Dokdo/Takeshima’s omission from the 1951 
San Francisco Peace Treaty returning Korean territory from Japan is 
evidence that the Allies recognized that Japan’s sovereignty was 
established before 1905.90 However, the omission was more likely the 
result of the Allies recognizing that not enough information was 
known at that time to establish sovereignty for either Japan or 
Korea.91 In response to Japan’s arguments, Korea has produced 
evidence of written histories, Japanese-created maps, and Korean 
government publications dating back to 1454 that question Japan’s 
interpretation of the historical record.92 The contested and 
inconsistent use of Dokdo/Takeshima before the twentieth century 
means that an international tribunal is more likely to focus on 
Korea’s use and control since the 1950s. Moreover, the fact that 
Dokdo/Takeshima is closer to other Korean territory complements 
Korean arguments based on effective control. Therefore, because the 
 
87. Van Dyke, Reconciliation, supra note 21, at 237 (citing Territorial 
Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute (Eri. v. Yemen), Arbitral Award, 
¶ 239 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1998), http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp? 
pag_id=1160).  
88. Van Dyke, Legal Issues, supra note 2, at 173 (referencing the 1904 
protocol that marked the moment when Korea no longer had the ability 
to act independently on international affairs); JAPANESE MINISTRY OF 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 29 (focusing arguments for effective 
control on the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries while omitting 
references to colonial control in the twentieth century). 
89. JAPANESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 29 (supporting 
Japanese claims based on actions occurring pre-twentieth century). 
90. Id. (arguing that Dokdo/Takeshima’s omission from the requirement 
that Japan relinquish specified territory implies a de facto recognition of 
Japanese sovereignty). 
91. Van Dyke, Legal Issues, supra note 2, at 184 (referring to the Treaty’s 
omission of references to Dokdo, “varying positions taken during the 
deliberation process indicate that the decision was made either because 
not enough information had been provided regarding the historical 
events surrounding Japan’s incorporation of Dokdo/Takeshima, or 
because the Allied powers felt themselves to be incapable, or inadequate, 
adjudicators”). 
92. KOREAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, supra note 1, at 5–8. 
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preponderance of factors supports Korea’s effective control, it is 
unlikely that the ICJ would render a ruling in Japan’s favor. 
The international community tends to agree that Korea’s claims 
are stronger under contemporary international law.93 Korea’s recent 
control of Dokdo/Takeshima includes the construction of a pier, the 
presence of a coast guard post, and the maintenance of a lighthouse.94 
Because these actions signal a visible and continued presence on the 
islets, they are likely determinative of effective control.95 Given the 
inherent harm in disrupting a sixty-year status quo, arbitration over 
the sovereignty issue would likely be found in Korea’s favor. Thus, 
Japan has little to gain by its continued insistence on adjudication. 
B. Korea and Japan’s Strategic Considerations 
From Japan’s perspective, the major downside for unilaterally 
accepting Korean sovereignty over Dokdo/Takeshima is the loss of a 
bargaining chip. In the 1990s, Japan strategically pressed the 
Dokdo/Takeshima issue to gain concessions from Seoul over fishing 
rights around the islands.96 However, the utility of continuing this 
strategy must be weighed against the adverse effect of deteriorating 
trust between the countries. Nationalistic tensions have created a 
“powder keg” in Northeast Asia with Japan at the center.97 Adopting 
a pragmatic Dokdo/Takeshima policy could remove at least one 
potential spark from a rapidly changing and tense region.  
If Japan waits to resolve the issue, its position may weaken as 
time passes. As island sovereignty often hinges on Realpolitik as 
opposed to international legal principles, a small compromise now 
might prevent larger concessions in the future.98 An illustrative 
 
93. See, e.g., Van Dyke, Reconciliation, supra note 21, at 238; Sibbett, 
supra note 7, at 1646. 
94. KOREAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, supra note 1, at 30; 
New Ulleung Quay to Help Defend Dokdo, CHOSUN (Sept. 28, 2011), 
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/09/28/20110928006
85.html. 
95. See Sibbett, supra note 7, at 1643 (explaining that displays of 
sovereignty are sufficient to establish territorial title). 
96. See KOO, supra note 14, at 86 (describing provocative Japanese claims 
to Dokdo/Takeshima as an attempt to maximize Japan’s bargaining 
position over fishing rights). 
97. Lehmann, supra note 52 (referring to tension between China, Japan, 
and Korea, “[i]f the fuse goes off on the Northeast Asia powder keg, the 
consequences will be immediate, global and dramatic. If, on the other 
hand, global governance would improve, so might governance in 
Northeast Asia.”). 
98. Cf. Glen W. Price, Comment, Legal Analysis of the Kurile Island 
Dispute, 7 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 395, 420 (1993) (advising that a 
concession from Japan in the Kuril Island dispute would be prudent, 
otherwise Japan may lose even more leverage in the future). Written in 
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example is the Kuril Islands dispute with Russia in which Japan’s 
hardline approach has not been effective.99 Japan continues to contest 
all four islets instead of just the two where its historical claims are the 
strongest.100 Although Russia’s desire for economic investment from 
Japan opened an opportunity for compromise in 1992, Japanese 
leaders were unable to muster the political capital to broker a deal.101 
As a result, in 2011 a newly resilient Russia showed less interest in 
compromise regardless of Japan’s legal or historical claims.102 If 
Japan’s power continues to recede relative to other countries in the 
region, the opportunity to achieve more obtainable goals will 
 
1993, this article accurately predicted the consequences of Japan’s 
hardline stance on the Kuril Islands: “If Japan does not take advantage 
of this situation by softening its current position and giving the Russian 
Government the leverage necessary to reach a compromise, Japan may 
lose the initiative and any chance to resolve the territorial issue. This 
would be a tragedy not only for Japan and Russia, but for the world 
community as a whole.” Id.; cf. Weitz, supra note 47 (concluding that 
Japan’s interests are best served by improving relations with Russia 
through compromise on the Kuril issue). 
99. Compare Price, supra note 98, at 396–97 (describing Japan’s past 
opportunities to make a compromise on the Kuril island dispute after 
the fall of the Soviet Union), with Oki & Yamaguchi, supra note 6 
(outlining the contemporary situation where compromise is very unlikely 
because Russia now uses the Kuril issue in conjunction with China to 
exert joint pressure on Japan). 
100. See Price, supra note 98, at 420 (writing about the Kuril dispute in 
1993: “To reach an agreement. . . . A good start would be for the 
Japanese to categorically renounce all claims to southern Sakhalin 
Island, claims for which Japan has little or no legal foundation.”). 
101. See id. at 420 (“Japan has . . . an abundant supply of investment 
capital and expertise that Russia desperately needs. If Japan does not 
take advantage of this situation by softening its current position and 
giving the Russian Government the leverage necessary to reach a 
compromise, Japan may lose the initiative and any chance to resolve the 
territorial issue.”); see also DMITRI TRENIN & YUVAL WEBER, CARNEGIE 
ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE, RUSSIA’S PACIFIC FUTURE: SOLVING THE 
SOUTH KURIL ISLANDS DISPUTE 1 (2012), available at 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/12/11/russia-s-pacific-future-
solving-south-kuril-islands-dispute/esoi (describing the current problem 
and offering a potential solution for compromise). 
102. See Jonathan Eyal, Russia Sees Japan as an Easy Target, THE CHINA 
POST (Nov. 4, 2010), http://www.chinapost.com.tw/commentary/the-
china-post/special-to-the-china-post/2010/11/04/278624/Russia-
sees.htm (“Moscow remains interested in ending its lingering territorial 
spat with Tokyo. But having seen how the recent Chinese-Japanese 
dispute over the Diaoyutai or Senkaku islands unfolded, Russia has 
concluded that Japan is an easy target. ‘Japan’s foreign policy is in 
complete disarray,’ says Alexander Panov, who heads Russia’s 
diplomatic academy.”). 
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diminish.103 Maintaining control over the Senkaku islands and 
strengthening the existing Japanese alliance with Korea should trump 
the nationalistic but increasingly unlikely goal of reclaiming lost 
territory.  
With respect to the Dokdo/Takeshima dispute, a conservative 
backlash in Japan is likely to accompany any significant move 
towards conciliation.104 However, Japanese leaders do not have to 
completely renounce national pride in order to resolve the issue and 
focus on the future.105 Japan has much to be proud of following World 
War II, and a pragmatic compromise does not necessarily undermine 
national identity and patriotism.106 If anything, the compromise 
proposed in this Note lacks the moral force of a total accounting for 
past atrocities.107 But more than sixty years after the war, 
acknowledging the past while focusing on the future may be the only 
politically viable option.108  
Strategically, Japan’s provocative stance may also be motivated 
by a concern that showing weakness on the Dokdo/Takeshima issue 
could hinder Japanese claims against China over the Senkaku 
Islands.109 However, the greatest beneficiary of the Korean and 
 
103. See China Overtakes Japan as World’s Second-Biggest Economy, BBC 
(Feb. 14, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-12427321. 
104. See Lind, supra note 19, at 143–44 (“Tokyo should avoid gestures that 
risk polarizing the Japanese public, such as official apologies or 
resolutions by the Diet.”). 
105. See id. 
106. See id. at 144. 
107. See generally Van Dyke, Reconciliation, supra note 21, at 239 (outlining 
suggestions for a more comprehensive reconciliation approach by Japan 
including an accounting of Japan’s annexation and occupation, 
recognition of the wrongfulness of comfort women and reparations, and 
a commitment to continue a joint development zone near Korea’s Cheju 
Island). 
108. See Lind, supra note 19, at 146 (“Ideally, countries would offer their 
victims the contrition they deserve. Through public apologies, 
reparations, and trials, victims of terrible suffering receive some measure 
of justice. But in the real world, the backlash that such contrition 
engenders is counterproductive to reconciliation. A better approach is to 
acknowledge the harms done while looking forward.”). 
109. See Dangerous Shoals, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 19, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21569740-risks-clash-between-
china-and-japan-are-risingand-consequences-could-be (highlighting the 
dangerous extent of China’s uncompromising ambitions over the 
Senkakus, “short of simply handing the islands over, nothing that the 
Japanese government could do could satisfy China. This week an 
editorial in the China Daily acknowledged that Japan is working to 
build bridges with China, but immediately dismissed the efforts as part 
of a ‘two-faced strategy.’”). 
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Japanese dispute is China, which can use tensions to level pressure 
against Japan toward its own territorial dispute over the Senkaku 
Islands.110 Furthermore, U.S. efforts to strengthen trilateral ties 
relative to China are undermined by inflamed tensions over 
Dokdo/Takeshima.111 To the extent that Japan’s security relies on 
America’s power, strengthening this Japanese-American alliance by 
resolving Dokdo/Takeshima is essential.112  
From a practical standpoint, a firm territorial boundary would 
allow Japan to peacefully cooperate in exploiting potential gas 
reserves in cooperation with Korea.113 Further, a good faith gesture 
could strengthen its relationship with Korea and avoid potential trade 
disruptions from future territorial disputes.114 Most importantly 
however, Japan can take a big step in promoting regional stability. 
Rather than showing weakness that undermines its other island 
claims, Japan will set a precedent by endorsing recent territorial 
control as the decisive factor in island disputes. This will allow Japan 
to better legally and politically protect islands it already controls in 
any disputes against China.  
China would prefer to use its power bilaterally to influence 
smaller regional nations.115 By strengthening political ties with Korea, 
 
110. David C. Kang, US Should Side with Korea on Dokdo, THE KOREA 
TIMES (Oct. 5, 2012), http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/ 
nation/2013/01/251_121590.html; see aslo Lehmann, supra note 52 
(describing that while China, Japan, and Korea are economically 
interdependent, past history and rising nationalism in each country 
continue to plague their relationships with mistrust). 
111. Kang, supra note 110; see also Yokota, supra note 9 (noting that Korea 
and Japan are America’s most important allies in Asia, and that 
cooperation between Korea and Japan is essential for maintaining 
America’s stance against North Korea). 
112. See THE ECONOMIST, On the Rocks, Again, supra note 53 (“America 
says it is neutral in the sovereignty dispute between Japan and China 
over the Senkaku or Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea. But it has 
confirmed the islands are covered by its security treaty with Japan.”). 
113. See Van Dyke, Korea’s Maritime Boundaries, supra note 3, at 538–40 
(recommending a series of boundary delineations to encourage 
exploitation of fish and natural resources). 
114. Cf. Japan and China: Ghosts of the Past, THE GUARDIAN (Sep. 17, 
2012), http://www.theguardian.com/global/2012/sep/17/japan-china-
ghosts-of-the-past-editorial (discussing how a flare-up over the Senkaku 
Islands caused trade problems between Japan and China because 
massive amounts of Japanese property were destroyed, which forced 
Japanese companies to suspend operations). 
115. THE ECONOMIST, On the Rocks, Again, supra note 53 (mentioning 
disputes in the South China Sea where Vietnam and the Philippines are 
urging for multilateral negotiations involving ASEAN as opposed to 
China’s bilateral approach). 
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Japan may have a better chance of maintaining its territorial position 
in the face of China’s claims. Korea and Japan are currently at odds 
over the Dokdo/Takeshima issue, but they share a common interest 
in protecting other territories against Chinese claims.116 In Korea’s 
case, China claims the Ieodo Reef, and in Japan’s case, it lays claim 
to the Senkaku Islands.117 If Japan allows its dispute with Korea to 
escalate, some commentators have suggested that Japan might face a 
united Korea and China as regional rivals.118 If Japan and Korea can 
begin to resolve their historical past, then they may recognize their 
joint strategic and economic interests.119 
As long as Dokdo/Takeshima is an issue, it will continue to evoke 
the bitter memories of the past. Although there are other issues that 
divide the two countries, including the issues of “comfort women” and 
wartime atrocities, Dokdo/Takeshima stands out in the minds of 
many Koreans as evidence that little has changed since the tragedy of 
colonial rule.120 For Japan, the benefits of resolving the 
Dokdo/Takeshima issue now outweigh the risks.  
C. Beyond Sovereignty: Resolving Boundary and Resource Issues 
Once Japan and Korea have resolved the issue of 
Dokdo/Takeshima’s sovereignty, they can begin to move forward in 
establishing territorial boundaries between the countries. Rich fishing 
resources and potential opportunities for exploiting hydrocarbons exist 
 
116. See Borowiec, supra note 48 (explaining that Korea’s decision to build a 
naval base close to the disputed Ieodo Reef is to defend against China 
and potentially demonstrate control over the reef); Dangerous Shoals, 
supra note 109 (describing the ongoing conflict between China and 
Japan over the Senkakus). 
117. See Borowiec, supra note 48; Dangerous Shoals, supra note 109. 
118. KOO, supra note 14, at 98 (“If South Korea–Japan relations become 
strained, an unintended consequence could be to bring South Korea and 
China together against Japan.”); see Kang, supra note 110 (arguing that 
China is the real beneficiary of the dispute between Japan and Korea 
and that Korean occupation is the decisive element for determining 
sovereignty). 
119. Cf. McGroarty, supra note 69 (stating that Vietnam and the Philippines 
have common economic interests and are also looking for buffers against 
Chinese power, including a stronger relationship with the U.S.). 
120. See Dong-Joon Park & Danielle Chubb, Why Dokdo Matters to Korea, 
THE DIPLOMAT (Aug. 17, 2011), http://thediplomat.com/new-leaders-
forum/2011/08/17/why-dokdo-matters-to-korea/ (“[T]o try to 
understand South Korea-Japan relations by focusing on the dynamics of 
the contemporary relationship is to get things upside-down. Add in an 
entanglement of historical regional resentments and a very important 
truth emerges: from the South Korean perspective, the dispute over 
these rocky outcrops is the big picture.”). 
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in the sea surrounding Dokdo/Takeshima.121 Although pragmatic 
agreements concerning fishing rights are already in place, both 
countries recognize that a permanent solution to territorial boundaries 
would be desirable.122 Due to Dokdo/Takeshima’s limited habitability, 
it is unlikely to be classified as an island entitled to an EEZ under 
UNCLOS.123 Even if it is classified as an island, international courts 
have often minimized the impact of islands when determining the 
demarcation of boundaries.124 
Both Japan and Korea are parties to UNCLOS, and both are 
interested in its principles being applied to regional disputes. An 
example of successful resolution resulted from the dispute between 
Romania and Ukraine concerning maritime delineation related to 
Serpents’ Island in the Black Sea.125 In that case, Romania was in a 
similar situation to Japan as Romania was contesting sovereignty of 
an islet over which Ukraine had effective control. In 1997, Romania 
signed a treaty similar to the agreement proposed in this Note, finally 
acknowledging Ukrainian sovereignty over the islet.126 In 2009, the 
ICJ resolved the countries’ contested maritime boundaries by 
determining that regardless of the islets’ status as an island under 
Article 121(3), the overall territory of the islets was too small and 
uninhabited to impact territorial delineations.127  
 
121. Van Dyke, Legal Issues, supra note 2, at 198. 
122. Id. (“Japan and Korea have reached pragmatic agreements to regulate 
fishing but both recognize that a longer-term or permanent solution 
would be desirable.”). 
123. See id. at 196 (referencing Judge Budislav Vukas’ explanation, “The 
reason for giving exclusive rights to the coastal states was to protect the 
economic interests of the coastal communities that depended on the 
resources of the sea, and thus to promote their economic development 
and enable them to feed themselves. This rationale does not apply to 
uninhabited islands because they have no coastal fishing communities 
that require such assistance.”). 
124. See id. at 198 (“[E]ven if Dokdo were a true ‘island’ entitled to generate 
an EEZ and continental shelf, it would not necessarily have a full effect 
on the maritime boundary of the East Sea/Sea of Japan.”). 
125. See Press Release, Int’l Court of Justice, Maritime Delimitation in the 
Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine): The Court Establishes the Single 
Maritime Boundary Delimiting the Continental Shelf and Exclusive 
Economic Zones of Romania and Ukraine (Feb. 3, 1999), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/132/14985.pdf. 
126. Jon M. Van Dyke, The Romania v. Ukraine Decision and Its Effect on 
East Asian Maritime Delimitations, 15 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J., 261, 
265–66 (2010) [hereinafter Van Dyke, The Romania v. Ukraine 
Decision]. 
127. Id. at 261–62 (“[T]he Court reconfirmed that small uninhabited islands 
will generally have limited or no impacts on delimitations and that such 
features should not generate extended maritime zones.”).  
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Serpents’ Island is comparable to Dokdo/Takeshima in that both 
islets are nearly the same size, have a few structures, and have 
government-sponsored coast guard personnel on the outcroppings.128 
The South Korean government has previously argued that small, 
uninhabited islets should not be entitled to an EEZ under the Law of 
the Sea.129 Regardless of whether an international court would agree, 
in light of the Serpents’ Island decision, a tribunal would probably 
discount Dokdo/Takeshima’s impact on the territorial boundary. 130 
As asserted above, the successful use of international arbitration 
could set a stabilizing precedent for the region.131 Using a neutral 
tribunal would allow the parties a face-saving mechanism if the 
decision goes against their interests. Japanese policymakers could 
achieve their proposed goal of a neutral legal resolution even if 
arbitration was not applied to the sovereignty issue. On the other 
hand, Japan’s interests in other outcroppings such as Okinotorishima 
may make it reluctant to participate in a decision that would likely 
invalidate its claims to a large EEZ base on small isolated 
outcroppings.132 For this reason, Japan may wish to negotiate a 
stipulation that a resolution of Dokdo/Takeshima will have no impact 
on other boundaries and leave the broader island territory issue for 
 
128. See id. at 262, 274–75. Serpents’ Island has 0.17 square kilometers of 
land area and lacks freshwater, but has structures, a lighthouse, and a 
pier. Dokdo has 0.18 square kilometers of land area and is uninhabited 
except for military personnel, seasonal fishermen and the structures 
associated with them. See id. 
129. See Van Dyke, Legal Issues, supra note 2, at 197 (“The Republic of 
Korea has tended to argue that small uninhabited islets should not be 
able to generate EEZs and continental shelves, following the language of 
Article 121(3) of the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention.”). 
130. See Van Dyke, The Romania v. Ukraine Decision, supra note 126, at 
276 (“Dokdo should be considered to be a ‘rock’ that ‘cannot sustain 
human habitation or economic life of [its] own’ under Article 121(3). . . . 
Even if Dokdo were somehow to be considered to be an ‘island’ rather 
than a ‘rock’ under Article 121, it would not be given much importance 
by a tribunal asked to delimit the maritime boundary between Korea 
and Japan because of its tiny size and relative insignificance . . . 
tribunals have repeatedly ignored or slighted islands in maritime 
delimitations, even ones that have substantial populations residing on 
them.”). 
131. See Van Dyke, Legal Issues, supra note 2, at 197 (“[I]f Japan and Korea 
could agree that Dokdo would not be entitled to generate a continental 
shelf or EEZ, that agreement might go a long way toward reducing the 
tension over sovereignty of the islets.”). 
132. The Japanese Government has spent tens of millions of dollars to 
prevent sea erosion from consuming a rock over 1,000 miles off its coast. 
Although the rock is small, Japanese officials hope it will entitle Japan 
to fishing rights and possible deposits of manganese and cobalt. 
Haberman, supra note 30. 
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another day.133 There is reason for optimism in the case of a 
negotiated stipulation and settlement since both countries have 
successfully reached previous agreements on fishing rights in the area 
surrounding Dokdo/Takeshima.134 
V. Conclusion 
Korea and Japan are natural strategic allies when it comes to 
preserving their territorial claims against Chinese ambitions. China’s 
claims to Japan’s Senkaku Islands and Korea’s Ieodo Reef, and 
China’s willingness to use economic penalties to further political goals 
threaten both Korea and Japan. A resolution of the 
Dokdo/Takeshima sovereignty issue would clear the way for decisive 
boundary agreements and possible collaboration between Korea and 
Japan over future discoveries of resources in the area. Japan should 
take the initiative because its sovereignty claims are unlikely to gain 
legal recognition, and there is no practical way to challenge Korea’s 
de facto control of the islets. This deal requires that Japanese leaders 
be willing to compromise on sovereignty in order to reach a 
settlement with Korea.135 Additionally, Korean leaders should strive to 
dial down the nationalistic rhetoric and recognize the two countries’ 
interdependence.136  
133. Cf. Carlos Ramos-Mrosovsky, International Law’s Unhelpful Role in the 
Senkaku Islands, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 903, 931–32 (2008) (questioning 
the effectiveness of UNCLOS for providing peaceable outcomes in Asian 
island disputes because small territories have a big impact on EEZs and 
sovereignty is absolute). 
134. Cf. id. at 906–07 (suggesting that the vagueness of customary 
international law allows parties to invoke international legal norms that 
can be construed to fit national interests, which is why formal legal 
processes of adjudication or arbitration are not advisable in the island 
dispute context). 
135. See Van Dyke, Reconciliation, supra note 21, at 238 (“Since the 
Japanese claim is weak in any event, and because this dispute prevents 
other matters from being addressed and resolved, Japan’s renunciation 
of its claim over Dokdo/Takeshima could prove to be a very useful 
gesture to promote a genuine reconciliation between the countries. This 
renunciation would allow Japan and Korea to delimit their EEZ 
boundary utilizing the equidistance line between Korea’s Ullungdo and 
Japan’s Oki Islands, which would also allow the two countries to resolve 
their fishing disputes.”). 
136. See Park & Chubb, supra note 120 (“The South Korean government 
must for its part be able to demonstrate to its citizens that Japan isn’t 
ignoring the link between their claims to the islands and the 20th 
century colonization of the country. Only then can the leadership in 
Seoul stop the reactive decision making and make bold efforts to shift 
the domestic conversation about how to move forward with the 
Japan-South Korea relationship. After all, cooperation between these 
two countries is in the interests of the entire region.”). 
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Whether future Japanese and Korean political leaders can meet 
this task and embrace the realism necessary to resolve the 
Dokdo/Takeshima issue remains to be seen.137 The island disputes in 
Asia are numerous and complex and have no easy solutions. In the 
context of nationalism and historical prejudice, these territorial 
disputes create dangerous opportunities for conflict. Thus, it may be 
time for a discussion on whether the principles of UNCLOS are best 
formulated for a peaceful resolution of these issues.138 Regardless, 
under the existing political and legal framework, compromise must 
start somewhere.  
The dispute between Japan and Korea over the 
Dokdo/Takeshima islets presents a unique opportunity for 
reconciliation. Though divided by history, the two countries are 
economically intertwined and are in similar positions confronting the 
regional realities of China’s rise. The symbolic influence of physical 
territory and the power of historically motivated nationalism cannot 
be discounted, but compromise will be more productive than 
confrontation. Settling the Dokdo/Takeshima issue is unlikely to 
resolve all historical animosity between Korea and Japan, but it will 
allow both countries to better manage their futures with China by 
setting aside past disputes. 
 
137. See generally Van Dyke, Reconciliation, supra note 21, at 239 
(advocating a more comprehensive alternative approach to reconciliation 
by Japan including an accounting of Japan’s annexation and occupation, 
recognition of the wrongfulness of comfort women and reparations, and 
a commitment to continue a joint development zone near Korea’s Cheju 
Island). 
138. See generally Ramos-Mrosovsky, supra note 133, at 906–07 (arguing 
that current global legal regimes, including UNCLOS, have enmeshed 
East Asia’s sea resources in emotional disagreements over sovereign 
territory while neither encouraging nor enabling the parties to resolve 
their problems by applying international law). 
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